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Media Participation in the Execution of a Search
Warrant Inside a Home Violates the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution:
Wilson v. Layne
CONSTITUIfONAL LAw - FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE -
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY - The United States Supreme Court held that
federal and state law officers violated the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches when they invited
reporters into a home to record the execution of an arrest warrant,
but that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because
the state of the law was unclear at the time the search was
conducted.
Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999).
At 6:45 a.m. on the morning of April 16, 1992, Deputy United
States Marshals, in conjunction with Montgomery County Police
officers and accompanied by a team of reporters, entered the home
of Charles and Geraldine Wilson to execute an arrest warrant.' The
officers were attempting to arrest Dominic Wilson, the son of
Charles and Geraldine Wilson, as part of a national program called
"Operation Gunsmoke," in which federal, state, and local police
worked together to apprehend dangerous felons and fugitives.
2
Dominic Wilson was the subject of three outstanding warrants
issued by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, all of which
directed "any duly authorized peace officer" to arrest Wilson and
bring him immediately before the circuit court to answer charges
that he had violated his probation.
3
1. See Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1695 (1999). Deputy United States Marshals and
Montgomery County Police officers were accompanied by a photographer and reporter from
the Washington Post. See id. The media team had been specifically invited by the U.S.
Marshals to accompany the officers as part of the Marshals' "ride-along policy," which
allowed members of the media to enter private homes with their cameras to observe and
record the apprehension of fugitives. See id. at 1700.
2. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct at 1695. Operation Gunsmoke, a national fugitive
apprehension program, concentrated on the apprehension of "armed individuals wanted on
federal and/or state and local warrants for serious drug and other violent felonies." See id. at
1694.
3. See id. Wilson was on probation after being convicted of felonious robbery, theft,
and assault with intent to rob. See id. at 1694. In one of the three outstanding warrants,
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Unbeknownst to the police officers, the address listed on the
warrants was that of Charles and Geraldine Wilson, Dominic
Wilson's parents.4 When the team of officers and reporters entered
the Wilsons' home, the Wilsons were still asleep, but upon hearing
the commotion in the house, Charles Wilson ran into the living
room to investigate.5 He was extremely angry at the intrusion, and
began cursing at the officers and demanding explanations from
them.6 The officers mistakenly thought that Charles Wilson was
Dominic Wilson and forcibly -restrained him. Geraldine Wilson
came into the living room shortly after her husband and witnessed
the police officers physically restraining him.
8
The police officers conducted a sweep of the house whereupon
they discovered that Dominic Wilson was not in residence and they
subsequently left the premises.9 The photographer and reporter
were present in the Wilsons' home during the entirety of the
entrance by the police officers, but did not assist in the execution
of the warrants.'
0
Charles and Geraldine Wilson sued both the federal and local
officers in federal district court for damages resulting from the
failed attempt to execute the warrant for Dominic Wilson."
Wilson was again charged with robbery. See id. at 1694 n.l. As a result of his previous
felony record and several "caution indicators" compiled by the Montgomery County Police
Department, Wilson was identified as a "target" of Operation Gusmoke. See id.
4. See id. at 1694.
.5. See id. at 1695.
6. See id.
7. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1695. The "caution indicators" listed by the Montgomery
County Police Department's computer indicated that Dominic Wilson was likely to be armed,
to resist arrest, and to assault police. See id. at 1694.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 1695. While in the home, the photographer took several photographs
while the reporter observed the unfolding situation. See id. at 1696. Neither the photographer
nor the reporter directly participated in the execution of the warrant, and the Washington
Post never published the photographs taken by the photographer. See id.
11. See id. The Wilsons sued the United States Marshals under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) (holding that petitioner Bivens was
entitled to seek monetary damages for injuries that occurred as a result of an improper
search under the Fourth Amendment). See id. at 1696. The Wlsons sued the Montgomery
County Police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), which in relevant part provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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Specifically, the Wilsons claimed that the presence of the reporters
during the officers' attempted execution of the warrant violated
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.1 2 Counsel for the defendant officers moved
for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.'3 The
district court denied the motion for summary judgment and the
defendants took an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
14
The appeal was first heard by a panel of the circuit court, which
reversed the district court and held that the officers were entitled
to summary judgment.15 The case was then reheard en banc on two
separate occasions where the court of appeals, albeit a divided one,
upheld the panel's decision.' 6 The court of appeals did not decide
the constitutional question of whether there was in fact a Fourth
Amendment violation; the majority held only that the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time of their actions,
no court had held that bringing reporters into a home dupng the
execution of an arrest warrant was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 7 Five justices dissented from the majority opinion,
reasoning that bringing the reporters along during the attempted
execution of an arrest warrant to record and observe the
proceedings violated the clearly established protections of the
Fourth Amendment.
8
The United States Supreme Court granted the Wilsons' petition
12. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1695. The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in relevant part provides that "[tlhe right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1695. Qualified immunity is an "[a]ffirmative defense [that]
shields public officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages if their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which [a] reasonable
person would have known." BLACK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 752 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
14. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1695.
15. See Wilson v. Layne, 110 F3d 1071 (4th Cir. 1997).
16. See Wilson v. Layne, 141 F3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 1998). Five out of the eleven judges
on the court of appeals dissented, and in an opinion by Circuit Judge Murnaghan, reasoned
that no reasonable police officer could have believed that the reporters' presence was
necessary to further "legitimate law enforcement purposes." See id. at 120 (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting).
17. See id. The right that the officers allegedly violated must be "clearly established" at
the time of the alleged violation. See id. at 114. "Clearly established," for purposes of the
United States Supreme Court's opinion, means that "the contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right .... [T]he unlawfulness [of the official's action] must be apparent." Wilson, 119 S.
Ct. at 1699 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)).
18. See Wilson, 141 F3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 1998) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
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for a writ of certiorari to determine whether the actions of the
officers in bringing the reporters into a private residence to
observe the execution of an arrest warrant violated the Fourth
Amendment, and, if so, whether the officers were entitled to
qualified immunity.'9
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the
Court, affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and held that
the officers' actions in bringing the media along to observe and
record the execution of the warrant did in fact constitute a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, but that the state of the law
was unclear at the time of the search and, as such, the officers
were entitled to a qualified immunity defense.
20
The Court began by stating that, under the doctrine of qualified
immunity, governmental agents are generally "shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known" 21 Although the Wilsons sued the federal
and county officials under different legal authorities, the Court
concluded that under both authorities the analysis for qualified
immunity was identical.22 The Court recognized that a two part
analysis is to be followed whenever any court has before it a claim
of qualified immunity for an alleged violation of a constitutional
right: first, whether the plaintiff has "alleged the deprivation of an
actual constitutional right," and second, whether that right was
"clearly established at the time of the alleged violation."23 The
19. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1696. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held in 1997 that federal officers who brought along members of the media to
videotape a search for entertainment purposes violated the Fourth Amendment and were not
entitled to a defense of qualified immunity. See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 512 (9th Cir.
1997). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated Hanlon and
Wilson because the circuits were split as to two important questions: (1) whether the actions
of the law enforcement officers violated the Fourth Amendment, and (2) if there was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, whether the officers were entitled to the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697.
20. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697. Justice Stevens dissented. See id. at 1701 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21. Id. at 1696 (emphasis added) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)).
22. See id. at 1696. The federal marshals were sued under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and the county officers were sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). See id. at 1695.
23. Id. The standard for analysis was set forth by the Court in Conn v. Gabbert, 119 S.
Ct 1292, 1295 (1999). In Wilson, Chief Justice Rehnquist writes that the reason for this
two-prong analysis is to "spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted
demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn-out lawsuit." Id. (quoting
1122 Vol. 38:1119
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Court then proceeded to examine whether the Fourth Amendment
was violated by the actions of the officers in allowing the reporters
to accompany them on the execution of the warrant.24
Chief Justice William Rehnquist began by exploring the history of
the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 25 The majority opinion noted that protection against
invasion of one's home is a fundamental principle embodied in the
ancient law of both the United States and England.2 6 Chief Justice
Rehnquist explored the Court's holding in Payton v. New York,27 in
which the Court held that the "overriding respect for the sanctity of
the home" meant that officers could not enter a home to make an
arrest without a warrant or exigent surrounding circumstances. 28 In
Payton, the Court also found that a warrant implicitly gave police
the authority to enter a home when there was reason to believe
that the suspect was within, but the authority is limited by the
scope of the warrant.
29
The Wilson Court noted that the arrest warrant for Dominic
Wilson gave the officers the authority to enter the home, but it did
not necessarily give the officers the authority to bring along
members of the media to witness the proceedings ° The Court
relied upon Arizona v. Hicks31 and Maryland v. Garrison32 for the
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)).
24. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1696.
25. Id. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1696. In 1604, the court in the English case of Semayne v.
Gresham held that "the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well as for
his defense against injury and violence, as for his repose . . ." Brief for Petitioner at 15,
Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999) (No. 90-1778). Expanding on the same theme, Sir
William Blackstone, in his commentaries on English Law, wrote:
[a]n arrest must be by corporal seising or touching the defendant's body; after which
the bailiff may justify breaking open the house in which he is; to take him: otherwise,
he has no such power, but must watch his opportunity to arrest him. For every man's
house is looked upon by the law to be his castle of defence [sic] and asylum, wherein
he should suffer no violence....
SIR WILLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 288 (St. George Tucker, ed.,
Augustus M. Kelly 1969) (1803):
27. 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980).
28. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697.
29. Payton, 445 U.S. at 604.
30. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697.
31. 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).
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proposition that police actions during the execution of a warrant
must be related to the ultimate objectives of the warrant in order
to ensure that the officers do not exceed the scope of the
warrant.3 The majority concluded that because the reporters did
not aid in the execution of the warrant, their presence was not
related to the objective of the intrusion into the Wilsons' home;
that objective being the apprehension of Dominic Wilson.-'
The Wilson Court next addressed three arguments by the
respondent officers in support of the reporters' presence. 35 First,
the officers argued that the presence of the media was justified
because it "further[ed] their law enforcement mission."36 The Court
responded rather tersely by stating, "[w]ere such generalized 'law
enforcement objectives' themselves sufficient to trump the Fourth
Amendment, the protections guaranteed by that Amendment's text
would be significantly watered down."37 The officers next argued
that the media presence would serve to accurately record the
proceedings, which could in turn serve two purposes: (1) aid in
developing good public relations for the police and (2) reduce the
possibility of abuses of power by the police while providing a
degree of protection for the officers s The Court dismissed both of
these arguments, stating that "even the need for accurate reporting
on police issues in general bears no direct relation to the
constitutional justification for the police intrusion into a home in
order to execute a felony arrest warrant." 39 The Court also stated
that although there are certain circumstances in which the
presence of third parties during the execution of a warrant is
proper, the facts of Wilson did not present such a case.40
Consequently, the Court held that the reporters' presence during
the execution of the warrants was a violation of the Wilsons'
32. 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987).
33. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1698.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1698-99.
39. Id. at 1698.
40. Id. at 1698. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, it is proper for the owner of
stolen property to accompany police officers during the execution of a search warrant to
facilitate the identification of the property. Id. at 1697. The Court, relying on its decision in
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996), also noted that it might have been reasonable for
the officers to have videotaped the execution of the warrant themselves for official use, but
it was not reasonable to bring members of the media along to record the proceedings for




Having satisfied the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis
by determining that the presence of the reporters during the
execution of the search warrant violated the Wilsons' Fourth
Amendment rights, the Court proceeded to discuss the second part
of the analysis: whether this right was "clearly established at the
time of the search."42 The Court began by noting that "government
officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted
qualified immunity."4 According to the Wilson majority, despite the
fact that the officers had violated the Wilsons' Fourth Amendment
rights, the officers would be protected by qualified immunity unless
it could be shown that the police actions were objectively
unreasonable in light of then existing "clearly established" rules of
law."4 Chief Justice Rehnquist turned to the Court's opinion in
Anderson v. Creighton45 for his discussion of the meaning of
"clearly established" with respect to the right violated by the
officer's conduct.
46
The Anderson Court found that the right allegedly violated must
have been defined to a level of specificity such that a reasonable
officer would be aware that his conduct was a violation of that
right.47 Furthermore, the Wilson Court determined that it is not
enough to say that a right is clearly established simply because it
falls under the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 4s Instead,
Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on the Anderson Court's language
when he stressed that "the contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right."49 The majority concluded that
although the police actions in allowing the members of the media
to accompany them into the Wilsons' home during the execution of
the arrest warrant was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
law was not clearly established at the time of the search and, as
41. Id. at 1698.
42. Id. at 1699.
43. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1699.
44. Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)).
45. 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
46. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1699.
47. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. The Anderson Court was careful to point out that its
decision did not mean that an officer would automatically be protected unless the conduct in
question had previously been found to be unlawful. Id. Rather, the Court stressed that
qualified immunity would be unavailable to the officer if "in light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness [of the action in question] [is] apparent." Id. (internal citations omitted).
48. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1699.
49. Id. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).
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such, the officers' conduct was not objectively unreasonable.50
The Court considered it significant that, at the time of the
search, it had become commonplace for members of the media to
accompany police on executions of warrants and that no court had
definitively held that such a practice was unlawful.51 The Court
acknowledged that Bills v. Aseltine,52 a circuit court opinion
decided five weeks before the events in the Wilsons' home took
place, anticipated the conclusion that the presence of a third party
during the execution of a warrant in a home violated the Fourth
Amendment unless the third party was aiding the police.- At the
time of the intrusion into the Wilsons' home, however, the majority
noted that Bills was the only federal case to address whether the
presence of third parties during the execution of a warrant was
unlawful when their presence was not in furtherance of law
enforcement aims.M As a result, the Court concluded that, at the
time of the attempted execution of the warrant in Wilson, it was
not clearly established that the presence of reporters during the
execution of an arrest warrant in a private home was a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.5
In stating that the officers' actions were not objectively
unreasonable, the Court also mentioned that, at the time of the
events in Wilson, both the United States Marshals and the
Montgomery County Sheriff's Department had media "ride-along"
policies in force.6 Chief Justice Rehnquist further noted that
between the events of Wilson and the arguments before the Court
pursuant to the grant of certiorari, there arose a split in the circuits
as to whether conduct such as that of the police in Wilson violated
the Fourth Amendment.57 The Court concluded that the state of the
law when the intrusion occurred was "at best undeveloped" and
that the officers' conduct was not objectively unreasonable in light
of established law.- Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of
50. Id at 1699.
51. Id.
52. 958 E2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992).
53. Bills, 958 F2d at 706. The police in Bills brought a security guard along to
participate in a search for and to identify stolen property that was not named in the warrant.
Id. at 709.
54. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1700.
55. Id.
56. Id. The Court referenced a booklet given to the Deputy Marshals that stressed
"fugitive apprehension cases normally offer the best possibilities for ride-alongs." Id. at 1700
n.4.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1701. In discussing the reasonableness of the officers' conduct and the
1126 Vol. 38:1119
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appeals and held that the officers were entitled to a defense of
qualified immunity.59
Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part
with the majority opinion and dissenting in part.60 Justice Stevens
agreed with the majority view that the presence of the reporters
during the officers' attempt to execute the arrest warrant for
Dominic Wilson was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 61 He
dissented, however, with respect to whether the Wilsons' right to
be protected from the type of intrusion that occurred during the
attempt was clearly established at the time of the attempt.62 The
dissent argued that it should have been obvious to the officers that
allowing the reporters to enter the Wlilsons' home without their
consent was a clear violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.63
Additionally, Justice Stevens pointed out that the majority had
failed to identify even one case where the presence of the media in
a private home during an execution of a warrant was found to be a
"reasonable" invasion of privacy.64 Finally, Justice Stevens attacked
the majority's reliance on a booklet distributed to the United States
Marshals regarding the Marshals' media ride-along policy by stating
that "[t]he notion that any member of that well-trained cadre of
professionals would rely on such a document... is too farfetched
to merit serious consideration."5
That the Justices of the Supreme Court disagree on whether the
officers' conduct in Wilson was reasonable in light of the Fourth
considerable split of judicial opinions regarding the issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist ended his
opinion with the following observation: "[i]f judges thus disagree on a constitutional
question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing side of the
controversy." Id.
59. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1701.
60. Id. at 1701 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. Id. at 1701 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
noted that Wilson was an example of one of those rare cases when the Court unanimously
found a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1702 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
62. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens declared
that his "sincere respect for the competence of the typical member of the law enforcement
profession precludes my assent to the suggestion that 'a reasonable officer could have
believed that bringing members of the media into a home during the execution of an arrest
warrant was lawful.'" Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting the
majority opinion).
64. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1702 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Id at 1704 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). To emphasize
this point, Justice Stevens quoted the Sheriff of Montgomery County, who said during his
testimony, "[w]e would never let a civilian into a home. . . that's just not allowed." See id. at
1704 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Amendment is no surprise, considering the Court's historical
struggle to define the parameters of the rights set forth therein.6
Although the right to privacy is not specifically guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has consistently found that
"the rights of privacy and personal security... [under] the Fourth
Amendment . . . are to be regarded as the very essence of
constitutional liberty."67 To help delineate the contours of the
Fourth Amendment's protections of individual privacy against
unfounded governmental intrusion, the Court has consistently
looked to the intent of the framers in drafting the Fourth
Amendment. 8
In the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States,69 the Court considered
whether a compulsory production of a person's private papers in a
forfeiture proceeding constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.70 A majority of the Court
held that such a compulsory production, in a criminal or
quasi-criminal case, was the equivalent of an unreasonable search
and seizure, and, as such, was within the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.7' Justice Joseph Bradley, writing for the Court,
explored in detail the then recent history in both England and the
United States surrounding the drafting of the Fourth Amendment. 72
The Boyd Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment was
drafted to protect United States citizens from the abuses and
66. See, e.g. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886) (compulsory production of
a person's papers to be used against him in a criminal proceeding is an unreasonable seizure
under the Fourth Amendment); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1914) (search
and seizure constituted an unreasonable invasion of privacy when federal officials performed
search under color of authority but without a valid warrant); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145, 150-51 (1947) (Fourth Amendment permits searches and seizures incidental to lawful
arrest, even without a warrant).
67. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947) (quoting Gouled v. United States,
282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931)).
68. See, e.g. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886) (constitutional protections
of persons and property should be liberally construed); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
389-90 (1914) (the framers of the Fourth Amendment sought to secure for the people
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145,
150-51 (1947) (the right of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment is the very essence
of constitutional liberty).
69. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
70. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622.
71. Id. at 634-35. In a familiar substance-over-form analysis, the Court emphasized that
the forfeiture case in Boyd Was quasi criminal in nature, and that by compelling Boyd to
produce papers against his will the government was subjecting him to an unreasonable
seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and was also compelling him to be a witness
against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
72. Id. at 624-27.
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governmental invasions countenanced at the time by Great Britain
and evidenced by such practices as the issuing of general warrants
and writs of assistance. 3 Justice Bradley recalled the general
outcry in America surrounding the Crown's use of writs of
assistance to empower revenue officers to search for smuggled
goods, and the almost unlimited discretion the writs gave to such
officers to conduct arbitrary searches and seizures.74 The majority
emphasized that it was against this backdrop of egregious invasions
of privacy by governmental officials acting under almost unlimited
authority that the drafters of the Bill of Rights composed the
Fourth Amendment.75 Although the Boyd Court did not specifically
mention a constitutional right of privacy, it stressed that the Fourth
Amendment was intended by the drafters to protect against all
governmental invasions into "the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life.
"76
Having established that the Fourth Amendment's protections
extended to seizures of a person's private papers and effects, the
73. Id. at 625. In the 1700s, the practice of issuing general warrants, which named
neither the person to be arrested nor the particular items to be searched for, became a
common one in England. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOuirH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 42 (1937). In 1762, John Wilkes, a member of
Parliament, anonymously wrote The North Briton Number 45, a pamphlet that criticized the
workings of the English government. Id. at 43. In response, Lord Halifax, the Secretary of
State, issued a general warrant to search for the authors, printers, and publishers of the
pamphlet. Id. at 43. Wilkes was arrested, along with forty-nine others, and brought suit
against the government challenging the legality of the general warrant. Id. at 44-45. In a
series of decisions, Chief Justice Pratt held that the general warrant was illegal. Id. at 44-47.
In 1766, William Pitt undertook a personal mission to have general warrants deemed illegal
in the House of Commons, which had previously declined to address the issue. Id. at 49. He
was successful in getting the House of Commons to declare general warrants universally
invalid, except as specifically provided for by Parliament. Id. at 49. During the debates on
this issue, Pitt made the following remarks:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter,
the rain may enter, but the King of England may not enter, all his force dare not cross
the threshold of the ruined tenement.
Id. at 49-50.
74. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625. The controversy surrounding the Crown's use of writs of
assistance was especially pronounced in Boston around 1761. LAssoN, supra note 73, at 51.
Historians generally agree that the famous controversy in Boston was the impetus for the
colonies' resistance and eventual revolt against the oppressions and tyranny of England. Id.
75. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625.
76. Id. at 630. Regarding the seizure of private papers, the Court noted that
[i]t is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where that right has never
been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense ....
Id. at 630.
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Court next addressed the treatment of evidence procured in such a
fashion in the 1914 case of Weeks v. United States.7 In Weeks, the
Court was faced with a circumstance where certain papers and
effects belonging to Weeks were seized by U.S. Marshals who
conducted a warrantless search of his apartment to collect
evidence tending to show that he was involved in mail fraud.78 The
Court had to decide whether the papers seized during the search,
which were used-by prosecutors against Weeks at his trial, were
properly admitted into evidence.
79
Justice William Rufus Day, writing for the majority, relied
extensively on Boyd to support the holding that the papers were
collected as the result of an unconstitutional search by the U.S.
Marshals.80 In reaching the holding, the Court took particular notice
of the fact that the U.S. Marshals acted in Weeks under color of
authority but without a properly sworn warrant based on probable
cause.8' The Court distinguished the holding in Weeks from those
cases in which it was held that, when engaged in a criminal trial, a
court will not take into account the manner in which evidence is
procured when the same is properly offered into evidence at trial.
8 2
In Weeks, the Court found that the evidence was gathered as a
result of an unconstitutional search by the federal marshals, and, as
such, could not properly be offered into evidence.83 The holding in
Weeks established the exclusionary rule for federal searches, which
77. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
78. Weeks, 232- U.S. at 386. Weeks was arrested by local police at his place of
employment. See id. at 386. Other policemen entered his home, without a warrant, and
searched it, eventually taking from it the papers and effects later in issue at his trial. See id.
The local police then gave the seized items to the U.S. Marshals, who went back, also
without a warrant, and conducted another search of Weeks' home. See id.
79. See id. at 389.
80. Id. at 393-94. In discussing the Fourth Amendment and the courts' duty to enforce
its protections, the Court stated:
[i]f letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment,
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in
their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
Id. at 393.
81. Id. at 397.
82. Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
83. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 396. The Court stressed the difference between evidence
incidentally acquired as a result of the execution of a legal warrant and evidence acquired
illegally in a warrantless search, as in Weeks. Id. at 396.
1130 Vol. 38:1119
Wilson v. Layne
prohibits in a criminal trial the introduction of evidence that was
obtained by means of an unconstitutional search and seizure.-'
After clearly holding that evidence obtained during a warrantless
search is excludable at trial in Weeks, the next major step in the
Court's recognition of a constitutional right to privacy embedded
within the Fourth Amendment came in 1947 when the Court
decided Harris v. United States.8 In Harris, the Court clarified its
stance on incidental searches performed under authority of a valid
warrant. 86 The Harris Court addressed the question of whether a
search of a home made incidental to the execution of a valid arrest
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.87 In Harris, federal agents
conducted an incidental search of Harris' home in conjunction with
the execution of a valid arrest warrant;88 During the search, the
agents uncovered specific evidence of an unrelated crime.89 The
Harris majority declined to extend the Fourth Amendment's
protections against unreasonable search and seizures to searches
incident to the execution of a. valid arrest warrant, even though the
evidence obtained thereby was in no way related to the crimes for
which the accused was arrested.90 In addressing the search, Chief
Justice Frederick Vinson, writing for the Court, stressed that the
Fourth Amendment protects an individual's right of privacy and
personal security.9  While acknowledging that unauthorized
governmental intrusions and abuses are the chief evils to which the
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment are directed, the Harris
Court concluded that the FBI's search of Harris' home as an
incident of his arrest was not an unreasonable invasion of his
84. Kevin E. Lunday, Note, Permitting Media Participation in Federal Searches:
Exploring the Consequences for the United States Following Ayeni v. Mottola and a
Framework for Analysis, 65 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 278, 282-83 n.35 (1997).
85. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
86. Harris, 331 U.S. at 150-51.
87. Id. at 150. In Harris, the FBI agents executed a valid arrest warrant for mail fraud
in the home of the defendant, Harris. See id. at 148. They proceeded, as an incident of the
arrest, to thoroughly search the entire home. See id., at 149. The search yielded an envelope
containing draft cards, which the agents seized. See id. The agents were specifically looking
for two stolen checks and other evidence of mail fraud, and were unable to locate them in
the home; however, Harris was later indicted and convicted of sixteen counts of possession,
concealment, and alteration of the draft cards found during the search. Id. at 146-47.
88. Harris, 331 U.S. at 148.
89. See id. at 148-49.
90. Id. at 155. The Court acknowledged that the draft cards were not related to the
crime listed on the arrest warrant, mail fraud, and that the search was not conducted under
authority of a search warrant. Id. at 149.
91. Id. at 150. Chief Justice Vinson characterized the rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment as "the very essence of constitutional liberty." Id.
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privacy.92
In its 1967 decision in Katz v. United States,93 the Supreme Court
again expanded the parameters of the constitutional right to
privacy by emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment was designed
to protect people and not places.94 In Katz, FBI agents attached an
electronic listening device to the outside of a public phone booth,
which they used to record certain phone calls made by the
defendant, Katz.95 The Katz Court declined to adopt the formulation
of the issues as presented by the petitioner because those
formulations centered on the phone booth as a "constitutionally
protected area."96 Instead, the majority stressed that the real
question in the case was whether Katz had a reasonable
expectation of privacy while placing the calls from the phone
booth.9 7 The Court held that the electronic surveillance in Katz was
an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment because it was clear that Katz had expected
privacy within the phone booth, and that the FBI agents did not
follow proper procedure by obtaining a warrant.98
The Katz Court rejected various arguments by the government,
including one in which the government claimed that the agents
acted with restraint by constraining their actions to the least
intrusive method available of searching the phone booth.99 The
92. Id. at 155. Because the Court found no violation of Harris' constitutional rights, it
found that the district court was correct in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained by the
FBI search, and affirmed Harris' conviction. Id.
93. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
94. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
95. Id. at 348. The FBI recorded Katz's end of phone conversations which tended to
show that he was involved in transmitting wagering information across state lines. See id.
The trial court permitted the prosecution to enter the recordings into evidence and Katz was
convicted of eight counts of transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation of a
federal statute. See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affumed
the conviction, holding that the FBI's conduct did not amount to a violation of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures because there was no
physical invasion of the phone booth. See Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir.
1966).
96. Id. at 350.
97. See id. at 351-52. In replying to the Govermnent's argument that Katz was
completely visible in the phone booth and could not have reasonably expected privacy, the
Court stated clearly that "what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the
intruding eye-it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he
made his calls from a place where he might be seen." Id. at 352.
98. Id. at 359.
99. Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57. The electronic surveillance equipment was placed on top
of the outside of the phone booth. See id. at 348. The Government argued that because there
was no physical invasion of the phone booth, the agents committed no trespass during the
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Court ruled that, despite the restraint displayed by the officers, the
type of surveillance employed necessitated the safeguards of a
properly issued warrant as a precondition to constitutionality.100
The majority reaffirmed the existence of several exceptions to the
necessity of a warrant, including when a search is conducted as an
incident to arrest, but maintained that the general rule is that
searches and seizures conducted without the authority of a
properly issued warrant are per se unreasonable for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment.' 0 '
Six months after the Court handed down its decision in Katz, the
case of Terry v. Ohio02 presented the Court with a question of
whether a search and seizure, in this case a "stop and frisk," made
without the probable cause necessary for the issuance of a warrant,
was unreasonable. ° In Terry, the Court was confronted with a
case where a policeman stopped Terry on the street after observing
suspicious behavior and subjected him to a pat down to search for
weapons before the policeman had probable cause to effectuate an
arrest. 04 Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which he noted that the question before it was a very
narrow one: whether it is always unreasonable for an officer to
stop and search a person for weapons before probable cause to
make an arrest exists.105
The Terry majority held that an officer who reasonably suspects
a person of being involved in a criminal action and who fears that
the person is armed and dangerous may stop him and subject him
to a limited search for weapons, even in the absence of probable
surveillance. See id. at 352-53. The Court rejected the argument, stressing that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places; and in light of the new listening technology, it was
clear that whether there was a constitutional violation of a person's privacy could not turn
on "the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id. at 353.
100. Id. at 358-59.
101. Id. at 357 n. 19.
102. 392 U.S. 1, (1968).
103. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
104. Id. at 7-8. In Terry, the officer observed Terry and a companion "casing" a store
and became suspicious that both men were armed. See id. at 6. The officer approached the
men, identified himself as a police officer, and asked them a few questions. See id. at 6-7.
After they responded, the officer grabbed Terry and subjected him to a pat-down, upon
which he discovered Terry was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. See id. at 7. Terry was
arrested and charged with carrying a concealed weapon. See id. At trial, Terry made a
motion to suppress the gun as being the product of an unreasonable search and seizure in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. See id. The trial court denied the motion and
Terry plead guilty to the offense. See id. at 8.
105. See id. at 15.
2000 1133
Duquesne Law Review
cause, without violating the Fourth Amendment.1os In so holding,
the majority carefully balanced the legitimate interests of the
government in seeking to prevent crime and to secure the safety of
both police officers and the public against the competing interest
of the individual and his right to be free from invasions of his
privacy.0 7 The Terry Court emphasized that, because the Fourth
Amendment protects people and not places, a person has as much
a right to be free from unwarranted governmental invasions on the
streets as he does in his home. l'8 Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that, under extremely restricted circumstances, an
individual's right to privacy must yield when a police officer
performs a limited search of his person in light of the officer's
objectively reasonable fear that he is engaged in criminal activity
and is armed and dangerous to the public.' o9
In the 1971 case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,10 the Court addressed the novel
question of whether federal officers could be held personally liable
for an unconstitutional search and seizure conducted in an
individual's home."' In Bivens, federal narcotics agents entered the
Bivens' home without an arrest warrant, proceeded to arrest
Webster Bivens, and made a thorough search of his home as an
incident to the arrest.112 Having previously narrowed the Fourth
Amendment protections of individual privacy with respect to "stop
and frisks," the Bivens Court again expanded those protections
with respect to warrantless searches of an individual's home.13 The
Bivens Court held that an individual is entitled to seek monetary
damages from federal officers who, while acting under color of
106. Id. at 30-31. The Court carefully reiterated that the determination of
reasonableness in cases such as Terry would turn on the precise facts of the case. Id. at 30.
The Court also re-emphasized, as a general rule, the holding in Katz that the police must
obtain a warrant based upon sworn oath and probable cause in every'practical instance to
avoid violating the individual's Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
107. Id. at 24-25.
108. Id. at 9.
109. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The Court stressed that the suspicions of the officer must be
based on not on subjective "hunches," but on objectively observable events which would
cause a reasonable person to believe the person was armed and presented a threat to the
safety of the officer or others. See id. at 27.
110. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
111. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. In this case, federal narcotics agents entered Bivens'
home in their official capacity and arrested him for narcotics violations. See id. The agents
did not have an arrest warrant; nonetheless, they manacled Bivens in front of his family, and





their federal authority, violate the individual's Fourth Amendment
rights by conducting an unconstitutional search and seizure.-14
Moreover, the Court rejected the government's argument that a
right to privacy is generally the province of state law rather than
federal; and, in so doing, stressed that the Fourth Amendment
provided for limitations on the power of federal authorities to
conduct their activities independently of the applicable state
laws.1 5 The majority noted that a federal officer acting under a
claim of federal authority to enter a home and conduct a search
poses a far greater threat to a person's right to privacy than does
an ordinary individual attempting the same." 6 The Bivens Court
concluded that an individual whose constitutional rights have been
violated in this manner by federal officials has the right to seek
redress in the form of money damages, but declined to address
when those same officials might be immune from liability by virtue
of their official position."
7
In 1982, the Court visited the immunity question and clarified the
applicability of a qualified immunity defense in a Bivens action
when it decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald.", The Harlow Court was
presented with the issue of whether the defendants, who were
presidential aides to former President Richard Nixon and who
allegedly conspired to have Fitzgerald removed from the Air Force
after he gave unfavorable testimony to Congress, were entitled to a
qualified immunity defense in a Bivens action for civil damages." 9
The Court held that the defendants were entitled to the protections
of qualified immunity.120
114. Id. at 397. The Court reasoned that the federal officers should be personally liable
for violations of a person's Fourth Amendment rights in light of the historic tendency of the
courts to provide for personal liability and monetary damages for an "invasion of personal
interests in liberty." Id. at 395.
115. See id. at 392.
116. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392. The Court reasoned that a person can more readily
protect himself against an individual trespasser's invasion of his home than he can against a
federal officer demanding entrance by claiming federal authority to do so. See id. at 394. In
support of this contention, the Court stated, "[tihe mere invocation of federal power by a
federal law enforcement official will normally render futile any attempt to resist an unlawful
entry or arrest by resort to the local police; and a claim of authority to enter is likely to
unlock the door as well." Id.
117. Id. at 397-98.
118. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
119. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806. The defendants in Harlow were alleged to have
participated in a conspiracy to have Fitzgerald dismissed from his position in the Air Force
in unlawful retaliation for his negative testimony in front of Congress regarding the
development and cost of a particular airplane. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
120. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
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In a majority opinion by Justice Lewis Powell, the Court
emphasized that the traditional reasoning behind extending
qualified immunity to government officials performing discretionary
functions was to spare them the costs and expense of defending
often insubstantial and unwarranted claims. 12' Furthermore, the
Court broadened the applicability of qualified immunity by
eliminating the subjective aspect of the test as it had evolved and
redefining the immunity defense in purely objective terms.122 As
noted by the Harlow majority, the subjective element of the test
had too often trumped the aims of the courts in recognizing
qualified immunity, to prevent insubstantial claims from going to
trial, by presenting an issue of fact for the jury to determine. 23 The
Court concluded that federal officials are to be held to an objective
standard and are entitled to claim qualified immunity if their
actions do not violate "clearly established" rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.
24
In 1987, the Court demonstrated the application of the objective
standard when it decided Maryland v. Garrison.'25 In Garrison,
police officers mistakenly performed a search of Garrison's
apartment pursuant to a valid search warrant.26  Based on
information they had collected and sworn to in the warrant, the
officers believed that there was only one apartment on the third
floor of the building in which Garrison lived; in reality, there were
two. 27 Before the officers realized that there were two apartments
121. Id. at 808. The Court reasoned that "insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly
terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the
complaint states a compensable claim for relief .. . , it should not survive a motion to
dismiss." Id.
122. See id. at 815-18. Prior to the Harlow decision, the qualified immunity defense had
both an objective and a subjective prong: a federal official would not have been entitled to
qualified immunity if he "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the
[plaintiff], or if he took the action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury." Id. at 815.
123. Id. at 816. Malicious intent, as part of the subjective aspect of the test for
qualified immunity, would ordinarily be an issue of fact for the trier of fact to determine. See
id. at 816. As such, an allegation of malicious intent by the plaintiff was often sufficient to
preclude summary judgment in suits against governmental officials claiming qualified
imunuity. See id.
124. Id. at 818.
125. 480 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1987).
126. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 80.
127. See id. The officers examined the exterior of the building, checked with a utility
company, and spoke to a reliable informant before securing the warrant. See id. at 81. All of
the information in the officers' possession led them to believe that there was only one
apartment on the third floor of the building and that the apartment belonged to a man
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and that they were in the wrong one, they discovered heroin and
drug paraphenalia within Garrison's apartment.'
28
Justice John Paul Stevens authored the majority opinion, in
which the Court addressed whether the search was
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stevens
noted that the "scope of a lawful search is 'defined by the object of
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to
believe that it may be found.' "129 The Garrison majority stressed
that a search must be "carefully tailored to its justifications" in
order to avoid the "character of the wide-ranging exploratory
searches the Framers intended to prohibit."30 The Court found that
the mistake on the part of the officers was objectively reasonable
in light of the situation they faced and the facts they possessed at
the time of the search and upheld the validity of both the warrant
and the search.
131
In Anderson v. Creighton,'32 the Supreme Court addressed the
application of qualified immunity in the context of a Bivens suit
against an FBI agent who allegedly violated the Creightons' Fourth
Amendment rights by conducting an unwarranted search of their
home because he mistakenly believed a bank robbery suspect was
hiding inside.'33 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court,
considered whether a federal agent could be held personally liable
in a Bivens action for civil damages for participating in a
warrantless search if he reasonably believed the search complied
with the Fourth Amendment.'1 In holding that Anderson was
entitled to qualified immunity, the majority placed particular
emphasis on the "clearly establishedl" language from Harlow.'3 In
named McWebb, against whom they secured the search warrant. See id. at 80.
128. See id. at 81.
129. See id. at 84.
130. Id.
131. See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 86-87. In elaborating on the holding, Justice Stevens
wrote, "[w]hile the purposes justifying a police search strictly limit the permissible extent of
the search, the Court has also recognized the need to allow some latitude for honest
mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making arrests
and executing warrants." Id. at 87.
132. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
133. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 636-37. The FBI agent in Anderson conducted a warrantless
search of the Creightons' home because he mistakenly thought a suspect in a bank robbery
that occurred earlier in the day was present in the home. See id. at 637.
134. Id at 636-37.
135. Id. at 639. In discussing the contours of a clearly established right, the Court
worried that if the right was defined too generally, "[p]laintiffs would be able to .convert the
rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified
liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights." Id.
2000 1137
Duquesne Law Review
order to be clearly established, Justice Scalia reasoned that the
right alleged to have been violated must have been previously
defined by law to a degree of specificity such that a reasonable
officer would know that his conduct was improper.136 The Court
recognized that law enforcement officers can mistakenly but
reasonably believe that their actions in conducting a search are
lawful under the Fourth Amendment.1 3 The Anderson Court
concluded that in such cases, where an officer reasonably believes
there is probable cause to search and exigent circumstances exist,
the officer should not be held personally liable if at some later time
it is determined that he was mistaken.
38
Five weeks before the events in Wilson v. Layne 39 took place,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in deciding
Bills v. Aseltine,40 confronted the issue of whether the presence of
a third party at the execution of a search warrant offended the
Fourth Amendment when the third party did not assist the police in
the search.41 The officers in Bills invited a security guard to
observe the execution of a search warrant in Bills' home and
allowed hihi to take pictures of the contents of the home.42 The
court of appeals in Bills reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendant officers, holding that whether
the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant by inviting a third
party to accompany them during its execution was a material issue
of fact to be resolved by the jury.14 In dicta, however, the court
136. Id. at 640.
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official
action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has
previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
137. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641.
138. Id.
139. 119 S. Ct.1692 (1999).
140. 958 F2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992).
141. Bills at 697. In Bills, police officers invited a private security guard to accompany
them while searching the Bills' home. Id. at 700. The guard, who worked for General Motors,
was brought along because he helped to identify suspected stolen property belonging to
General Motors that was not specified in the search warrant. See id. at 699-700. The guard
observed the proceedings without assisting the officers in conducting the search, but took
231 pictures of certain parts and equipment located in the home. See id. at 700. The
pictures were later used to procure another search warrant for the photographed items. See
id.
142. Id. at 699-700.
143. Id. at 705.
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acknowledged that because the third party was not present to
assist the police, his presence and activity within the home was not
condoned by any known legal doctrine.' 44 The court remanded the
case specifically to determine whether the officers' conduct in
inviting a private citizen into the home to view the execution of the
warrant was an unconstitutional invasion of the Bills' Fourth
Amendment rights.
145
In 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit was faced with similar circumstances in Ayeni v. Motolla.
146
The issue in Ayeni was whether an officer unconstitutionally
invaded the Ayenis' privacy by bringing members of the media into
their home to videotape the execution of a search warrant. 47 The
court concluded that the officer had exceeded the scope of the
search warrant by allowing persons unauthorized by the warrant to
observe its execution. 148 In so concluding, the court emphasized
that the sole reason the media personnel were present in the home
was to videotape the proceedings for public broadcast, and that
such an invasion of privacy was the very harm the Fourth
Amendment strives to prevent.149 The court also addressed whether
the officer could have reasonably believed his conduct in inviting
media participation in the search did not violate clearly established
law such that he would be entitled to qualified immunity.150 The
majority answered negatively, holding that the Ayenis' right to be
protected from unwarranted invasions of the media into their home
was clearly established at the time of the search and, as such, the
officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because he could not
have reasonably believed his conduct in bringing the camera crew
into the home was lawful.' 5'
144. Id. at 703.
145. Id. at 704-05. According to the court, "[tihe critical question in this case is
whether the police officers engaged in any constitutionally unreasonable act in permitting or
facilitating [the security guard's] presence in plaintiff's home." Id. at 704.
146. 35 F3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
147. Ayeni, 35 F3d at 684.
148. Id. at 686. After observing that the officer had exceeded the scope of the authority
granted him by the warrant in bringing the camera crew into the Ayenis' home, the court




151. Id. Although the court grounded its holdings on well-established Fourth
Amendment principles, it re-enforced its conclusions with a federal statute, which reads:
[a] search warrant may in all cases be served by any of the officers mentioned in its
direction or by an officer authorized by law to serve such warrant, but by no other
person, except in aid of the officer on his requiring it, he being present and acting in
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In light of the ever-encroaching presence of the media in almost
every aspect of daily life, the issues addressed by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Wilson v. Layne'52 were long overdue
for analysis and clarification. The Wilson Court properly realized
that the determination of whether a law enforcement official
exceeds the scope of a warrant or abuses his official authority,
thereby violating an individual's Constitutional rights and exposing
himself to liability, is a function of the circumstances in which he
acts, the time of his action, and the prevailing law at that time.
When faced with such a claim against a law enforcement officer,
the Court must carefully analyze the claimi within the specific
timeframe and context of the factual circumstances it presents,
keeping in mind that the ultimate goal is the preservation of the
fundamental guarantees of the Constitution.
The Court has consistently and vehemently protected the rights
of individuals against unwarranted governmental intrusion into the
privacies of life.'5 At the same time, the Court has struggled to
balance the legitimate interests of the government in preventing
crime, securing the safety of its officers, and instilling public
confidence in law enforcement against the very fundamental right
to privacy embodied in the Constitution. In very specific instances,
as it did in Terry v. Ohio,14 the Court has deemed it appropriate
for the right to privacy to yield to the countervailing concerns of
the safety of police officers or of the general public.' 55 More often,
though, the Court has faithfully protected the ainis of the Fourth
Amendment by recognizing a Constitutional right to privacy and by
expanding the contours of that right so as to insulate individuals
from unwarranted governmental intrusions into the most personal
areas of their lives.15
its execution.
18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994).
152. 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1696 (1999).
153. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886) (holding that a compulsory
production of a person's private papers in a criminal case is an unreasonable search and
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (stating that the government's actions in recording a private conversation in a public
phone booth without a warrant was a violation of Fourth Amendment right to privacy); and
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
police from entering a suspect's home without a warrant or consent).
154. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
155. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
156. See, e.g., Weeks v. U.S., 232 U. S. 383 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule for
evidence obtained by means of an unreasonable search or seizure); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that federal
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At first glance, the deceptively simple analysis of Justice Stevens
in his Wilson dissent is tempting. Of course, the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures is clearly established by
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. In his Wilson dissent,
Justice Stevens stressed that it was well settled at the time of the
events in Wilson that an officer committed a trespass when he
allowed a civilian to enter another's property without the owner's
consent.157 Justice Stevens maintained, therefore, that no competent
law enforcement official could have reasonably believed that
bringing members of the media into a home without its owners'
consent was lawful in light of the Fourth Amendment. 158 In
hindsight, upon calm and reflective analysis, and years after the
events took place, it may seem elementary that the officers' actions
in bringing the media into the Wilsons' home violated the mandate
of the Fourth Amendment. However, at the time of the events in
Wilson, in the circumstances confronting the officers, in the
prevailing law enforcement climate and in light of the media
ride-along policies in force, the violation was considerably less
apparent.
The dissenting Justice Stevens concentrated his analysis on what
he deemed a "well established principle" that "police action in the
execution of a warrant must be strictly limited to the objectives of
the authorized intrusion."159 Because the Wilson majority agreed
and expressly held that the presence of the media in the Wilsons'
home did not further any legitimate law enforcement goal, and so
was not related to the objectives of the search, Justice Stevens
found that it was "clearly established" that the police conduct was
objectively unreasonable.
60
The major disagreement between the majority and the dissent,
then, is over the meaning of "objectively reasonable." The majority
focused on the dearth of federal opinions on point, and the media
ride along policies in force at the time of the search for its holding
that the police conduct was not objectively unreasonable. Justice
Stevens, in turn, relied upon a federal statute and noted that the
Montgomery County Sheriff, who was a supervisor of the local
police officers but was not present for the search, admitted that he
law officials can be held civilly liable for violations of individual's Constitutional rights).
157. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1703-04 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
158. Id. at 1701 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. Id at 1702. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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would never have let a civilian into the Wilsons' home. 161 Justice
Stevens maintained that the Sheriff's statement was better evidence
of the officers' reasonable understanding than that relied upon by
the majority.162 The subjective prong of the qualified immunity
analysis was abandoned in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, however, and the
majority correctly applied an objective standard to assess the
reasonableness of the federal and state officers' conduct during the
execution of the search warrant in Wilson.
Justice Stevens' argument is flawed in that it appears to assume
that many police actions later found to be violative of the Fourth
Amendment are necessarily objectively unreasonable at the time
they are performed. If that were indeed the case, the doctrine of
qualified immunity would have almost no applicability in Fourth
Amendment violations, as the finding of a violation would
practically necessitate the finding of unreasonableness of the
officers' prior actions, thereby routinely depriving them of qualified
immunity that turns on "objective legal reasonableness."1' The
Wilson majority properly rejected the invitation to reason from
hindsight, recognizing that the objective reasonableness of official
action is a function of clearly established law in place at the time
the action takes place, which may or may not be reconsidered and
found unreasonable at a later point in time. To have held
otherwise, the Court would have required law enforcement officers
to accurately predict future trends in Constitutional law while in
the midst of performing their duties, and, in instances where they
are unfortunately but reasonably mistaken, to suffer the
consequences.
Jennifer L. McDonough
161. See id. at 1704. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on
18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994)).
162. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1699. Ironically, in Maryland v. Garrison, a majority opinion
authored by Justice Stevens, he wrote, "[w]hile the purposes justifying a police search
strictly limit the permissible extent of the search, the Court has also recognized the need to
allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and
difficult process of maling arrests and executing warrants." Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S.
79, 87 (1987).
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